Introspective Machines: Are LLMs Better at Self‐Reflection Than Humans? - Cappelen - 2024 - Philosophical Perspectives - Wiley Online Library
Use the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more. This article challenges conventional boundaries between human and artificial cognition by examining introspective capabilities in large language models (LLMs). Although humans have traditionally been considered unique in their ability to reflect on their own mental states, we argue that LLMs may not only possess genuine introspective abilities but potentially excel at them compared to humans. We discuss five objections to machine introspection: (1) the lack of direct routes to self-knowledge in training data, (2) the conflict between static knowledge and dynamic mental states, (3) the distorting effects of reinforcement learning on self-reports, (4) LLMs own denials of inner experience, and (5) arguments that LLMs simply mimic language without understanding. We think all these arguments fail and that there are deep parallels between human and machine introspection. Most provoca