Overly Convenient Excuses — LessWrong
This sequence focuses on questions that are as probabilistically clear-cut as questions get. The Bayes-optimal answer is often infeasible to compute, but errors like confirmation bias can take root even in cases where the available evidence is overwhelming and we have plenty of time to think things over. In “Absolute Authority,” I argued that you don’t need infinite certainty: If you have to choose between two alternatives A and B, and you somehow succeed in establishing knowably certain well-calibrated 100% confidence that A is absolutely and entirely desirable and that B is the sum of everything evil and disgusting, then this is a sufficient condition for choosing A over B. It is not a necessary condition . . . You can have uncertain knowledge of relatively better and relatively worse options, and still choose. It should be routine, in fact. Concerning the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4, we must distinguish between the map and the territory. Given the seeming absolute stability and unive