The Free Rider Problem (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
In many contexts, the efficient production of a good by a group is jeopardized by the incentive each member of the group has not to contribute towards its production. If then each member may have an incentive not to contribute, leaving the work of producing the good to the others. In situations with this structure, I can reason: if others are producing the good, I will receive it without contributing; if not, I will not receive it if I do contribute; so either way, I am better off not contributing. But if many of us reason in the same way, this can threaten to make each worse off than they would have been if all had contributed. This is the free rider problem, which has two main manifestations. In its non-production manifestation, these incentives prevent us from producing the good at all. In its free riding manifestation, the good is being produced because some group members are contributing, but it is being produced inefficiently because of the non-contribution of others (the free ri