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Phil 340: Smart’s Identity Theory

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As we’ve mentioned in class and previous notes, some philosophers use names like “physicalism” or “type physicalism” for the view we’re about to discuss. But we’re using those labels in broader senses: either for the very broad view that there are no souls, or for the somewhat narrower view that mental facts supervene on physical facts. The view we’re about to discuss, which we’ll call identity theory, is just one kind of materialist or physicalist view, as we’re using those labels. Another name sometimes used for this view is “Central State Materialism,” becuse it identifies mental states with states of your brain / central nervous system. We begin with the observation that there seem to be lawful (that is, systematic and non-coincidental) correlations between our mental states and states of our brain. An example philosophers often use for this is that pain seems to be correlated with having your “C-fibers” stimulated or firing. C-fibers are a real thing. They have some connection to

Phil 340: Smart’s Identity Theory As we’ve mentioned in class and previous notes, some philosophers use names like “physicalism” or “type physicalism” for the view we’re about to discuss. But we’re using those labels in broader senses: either for the very broad view that there are no souls, or for the somewhat narrower view that mental facts supervene on physical facts. The view we’re about to discuss, which we’ll call identity theory , is just one kind of materialist or physicalist view, as we’re using those labels. Another name sometimes used for this view is “Central State Materialism,” bec

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